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# The Centrists Can Not Hold
- URL: https://patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io/the-centrists-can-not-hold/
- Published: 2026-11-08T15:24:22.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-08T15:24:22.000Z
- Author: Karl Stomberg

On November 1st, Rep. Haley Stevens reached the logical endpoint of her post-primary journey when she publicly endorsed Republican US Senate candidate Mike Rogers. Ever since her loss in the August primary to Abdul El-Sayed, she had maintained a frosty relationship with her formal rival, primarily centered around issues of Israel and anti-semitism. The final straw was an inflammatory anti-Israel ad — not produced by the campaign — and El-Sayed’s refusal to denounce it. Stevens’s move was just the latest of many similar sore loser revolts from the right flank of the Democratic Party, with the most notorious being Andrew Cuomo’s independent bid for mayor after losing the primary to Zohran Mamdani.

What makes all of these revolts particularly interesting is their impotence. In nearly all cases, officials within the Democratic establishment, [up to and including former president Barack Obama](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/24/barack-obama-abdul-el-sayed-michigan?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), have rallied around the progressive nominees and shot back against the more conservative challenges. It is a far cry from what those on the left have come to expect, as many still cringe when remembering the [alleged phone calls from Obama](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/looking-obama-s-hidden-hand-candidate-coalescing-around-biden-n1147471?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) which caused the party to rally around Joe Biden in 2020, crushing the early momentum of Bernie Sanders. Instead, at the end of the day, Mamdani and El-Sayed won comfortable victories with the support of the supermajority of Democrats.

The difference reflects a shift within the Democratic Party and the political world as a whole. In the aftermath of the 2024 presidential election, many on the Democratic right [complained about the growing influence of “the groups” on the Democratic left](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/opinion/democrats-interest-groups-majority.html?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io). The general argument was that a small number of hyper-engaged, hyper-liberal activists, organized into groups like the ACLU or the Sunrise Movement, were putting undue pressure on Democratic candidates to take positions that were far outside the mainstream, making it difficult to win competitive elections. The archetypal example was [medical care for transgender prisoners](https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/verify/harris-transgender-care-surgeries-prisoner-ad-claim-10-10-2024/275-5c57c37f-51d1-4e8b-87df-d5ddeb262bc8?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) — Kamala Harris’s tentative endorsement of the idea in 2019 came back to bite her in 2024\. 

What these self-identified centrists did not seem to realize was that a similar process was taking place in their own camp. Centrism as a political project is just as closely tied to specific groups and donors, and specific ideological constraints, as the left or right. As the positions of this centrist movement become more unpopular, for reasons outside of their control, the center will face a crisis that it is only beginning to see the ramifications of.

## **Making a Movement**

In June of 2025, the centrist movement met for the first time in the second Trump term. [WelcomeFest](https://newrepublic.com/article/211447/welcome-fest-moderate-politics-2026?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) was hosted by a specific organization (WelcomePAC), but it served as a who’s who of the modern centrist movement within the Democratic Party. Speakers included elected officials like Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-MA) and Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), consultants and staffers like David Shor and Adam Jentleson, and writers like Derek Thompson and Matt Yglesias. Whether they arrived there via opportunism or true belief, what united all attendees was a belief that the ascendant left flank of the Democratic Party must be stopped. 

The event began to lay the basic foundations for what the centrist movement would look like in the era of the second Trump administration: explicitly pro-capitalist, anti-woke, and anti-left. In many ways, it was the Third Way ideology of the Clinton years updated for modern times — pundits pining for a [”Sister Souljah” moment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sister%5FSouljah%5Fmoment?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) and a dedication to crushing those on the activist left as represented by elected officials like Sen. Bernie Sanders and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. All of this was funded and implicitly done on behalf of some of the largest corporate forces who had not yet jumped ship to the Republican Party.

While WelcomeFest itself [was not particularly able to articulate](https://www.hamiltonnolan.com/p/what-is-centrism?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) what that may look like as a positive vision, the incentives of money and electoral wins began to organize the centrists more explicitly. On the ideas side, two general projects came to dominate the scene: popularism and abundance. The former had been around for a few years, and was delightfully tautological. In order to win elections, [popularism claimed](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/08/opinion/democrats-david-shor-education-polarization.html?eafs%5Fenabled=false&ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), Democrats should simply avoid the things that were unpopular and emphasize the issues that were popular. Unspoken in the idea — but very clear in the advocacy of its proponents — were the specific policies that popularists believed should be discarded: transgender rights, immigration reform, and cutting funding for the police. 

Abundance brought a more explicit positive policy goal to the centrist movement. [Originated by Derek Thompson and Ezra Klein](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/03/abundance-americas-next-political-order/682069/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), the basic claim of their essay and resulting book was that in order to truly deliver for people, the government had to streamline a whole slew of things to encourage production. At its most extreme, abundance encouraged supply-side regulation slashing, allowing for the building of more housing and transportation. What brought the book under the Democratic banner, and therefore the party’s centrist movement, was how it sought to make government itself better at delivering goods and services itself. However, it quickly became clear that abundance did not mesh well with the centrist movement’s focus on electoral wins: polling found that the ideas of the book [almost universally polled worse](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/04/democratic-research-finds-voters-prefer-populism-over-abundance-00543188?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) than the economic populism championed by the left.

Ultimately, neither of these ideas were able to do much for the centrist cause because they were quickly and more effectively adopted by the left. No one translated the idea of [popularism](https://zeeshanaleem.substack.com/p/zohran-mayor-socialism-popularism-israel-palestine-defund) or [abundance](https://prospect.org/2025/07/03/2025-07-03-ezra-klein-meets-zohran-mamdani/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) better than socialist mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani, who largely avoided talk of policing and social issues in favor of affordability issues — all while making catchy videos about reducing regulations for small business. Across the country, other progressives and socialists followed his lead. Centrists could not simply applaud these wins: fundamentally the movement was not about ideas, but about serving the interests of the capital funding it. With little juice being squeezed from its great thinkers, the shape of the centrist movement in Trump's second term was instead defined by money. 

Throughout the 2020s, two main groups had been building as the main funders of centrist Democratic candidates — the tech lobby and the Israel lobby. [AIPAC and the Israel lobby have become the most notorious](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/13/nx-s1-5923565/aipac-israel-primary-elections?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), working through PACs like United Democracy Project and dozens of shell PACs to funnel money from largely right-wing donors. Meanwhile, tech started out represented largely by crypto, but it has increasingly [moved to AI](https://fortune.com/2026/11/04/candidates-backed-by-ai-super-pacs-result/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) as that industry has received more funding. Together, these two broad groups pumped hundreds of millions of dollars in Democratic primaries across the country to mixed success; outside spending from AI PACs certainly helped [boost candidates like Micah Lasher in NY-12](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/23/micah-lasher-wins-new-york-congress-primary-00972335?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), while his opponent received support from another AI PAC [which narrowly rescued Valerie Foushee](https://prospect.org/2026/02/25/ai-anthropic-claude-super-pac-valerie-foushee-congress-north-carolina/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) in NC-04\. AIPAC was similarly able to effectively win most races in the Illinois congressional elections and [firmly rebuffed Cori Bush’s comeback attempt in MO-01](https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2026-08-05/ty-article/aipac-backed-democrat-defeats-aoc-ally-cori-bush-in-missouri-primary/0000019f-d0c5-db33-a5ff-f2f501d10000?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io).

Still, centrists lost some of their most high-profile electoral battles. The New York mayoral election was the earliest blow, followed by surprise Congressional elections in New Jersey where left-wing Democrats picked up the affluent suburban [NJ-11](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/former-rep-tom-malinowski-concedes-progressive-activist-analilia-mejia-rcna257100?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) and [NJ-12](https://newjerseymonitor.com/2026/06/02/adam-hamawy-democratic-primary/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io). In the most expensive US Senate primary on the Democratic side in Michigan, [AIPAC spent $33 million](https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/elections/2026/aipac-has-spent-a-record-amount-on-michigans-senate-primary-the-biggest-test-of-its-influence-yet/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) supporting Haley Stevens, who fell short to Abdul El-Sayed.

There are many potential explanations for the resurgence of the electoral left in 2026, including a general dissatisfaction of the Democratic base with the Democratic Party leadership. However, one can not discount the particular shape that the centrist movement has taken as a result of the moneyed influence of Israel and AI. [Polling](https://news.gallup.com/poll/712751/americans-cool-toward.aspx?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) [has](https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/american-favorability-israel-drops-record-low?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) consistently found that Democratic voters — and even voters at large — heavily disapprove of both sources of money. The effects were two-fold; progressive candidates were able to turn their spending disadvantage into an advantage by tying their opponents to these unpopular groups, and their opponents were largely unable to break out of unpopular positions without risking the money spigot being turned off.

These problems played out on the electoral level during the Democratic primaries, but the fall of Haley Stevens shows the inescapable personal contradictions at play. Online commenters have long noted how dabbling in transphobia [is often the first step into an outright decline into bigotry and conspiracism](https://www.them.us/story/timeline-jk-rowlings-descent-into-transphobia?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io). That specifically is a problem that has played out among the centrist movement as some have moved hard to the right on trans issues, but we now see the same problems arising with support of Israel. For hardcore Zionist Democratic centrists who find their status slipping within the broader party, the two options in the long-term seem to be either a clean break or a total breakdown. AI boosters are not quite at that same level, but they have also not yet received the same level of attention. However, beyond the specific funding sources or personal breakdowns, there are even bleaker structural signs for the centrist movement. 

## **The Problem of Negative Polarization**

There has been a major shift playing out over the course of the 21st century in terms of how people consider their political affiliation. [Near the start of the 2000s](https://www.vox.com/xpress/2014/11/12/7202983/democratic-party-unpopular-2014?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), both the Democratic and Republican parties actually had majority approval ratings among all voters, peaking at just over 60 percent within a few years of each other. Today, [both political parties are underwater](https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/favorability/us%5Fpolitical%5Fparties?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), with neither reaching 40 percent approval rating. Still, at the same time, political polarization has only increased, with [ticket splitting between different levels of government](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/the-postwar-history-of-senate-presidential-ticket-splitting-part-one/?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) completely collapsing and third party politics as irrelevant as ever.

The way to square that circle is through an understanding of negative polarization. Rather than voters supporting a candidate or party because they approve of them, they are instead driven by the need to stop the candidate or party on the other side. This is not entirely definitive — most Democratic politicians are still approved of by a majority of Democratic voters, and the same can be said for Republicans — but it explains an important mechanism. Even within the party, you see that same process work itself out: centrists defend their candidates by railing against the excesses of the left, while the left attacks the complacency and cruelty of the center.

Negative polarization is almost inherently anti-centrist, at least in its traditional definition of finding common ground between all sides. Many people may long for a time when politics were more civil, but negative polarization makes reconciliation significantly more difficult. Instead, centrism now largely exists as two separate projects: one within the left-wing of the Republican Party, and one within the right-wing of the Democratic Party.

Neither side is faring well. By this point, the Republican Party’s rejection of moderation needs little explanation — Donald Trump has served as the party’s presidential nominee in three consecutive elections, and his endorsements of hyper-conservative candidates still serve as near-royal decrees among the Republican electorate. However, the decline of centrism within the Democratic Party is still a relatively new phenomenon, and we are only beginning to see what a shift to the left may look like. The Democratic Party has key differences from the Republican Party: it is more diverse and generally reliant on a broader base of fundraising as well. That has generally complicated the coalitional politics of a leftward shift.

To understand recent election wins by progressives, it is important to understand the difference between what I will call “ideological” voters and “partisan” voters. Ideological voters are often more educated, engaged voters who vote based on their commitment to a specific issue or broader set of goals. They are often less explicitly partisan, in that they get more excited about candidates than supporting the Democratic Party specifically. If you have donated to the ACLU, volunteered for a candidate, or are reading this piece then you are probably an ideological voter. On the other side are institutional voters, who skew less engaged though include many relatively active members of the party. On the Democratic side, they might be described as “vote blue no matter who,” whether out of a personal connection to the party or a fervent hatred of the other side.

Numerically, most Democratic voters are partisan voters: unless they have a very specific reason not to, they are overwhelmingly going to vote for whoever the Democrat is, and will get mad at anyone who doesn’t. As a result, they often end up supporting whoever the “party pick” is in the primary, as they identify strongest with the most notable faces of the party: Obama, Biden, and whoever their local governor, US Senator, or Congressperson is. Activists who see themselves as belonging to either a centrist or leftist “movement” are much more often ideological voters. Hardcore supporters of Hillary Clinton in 2008 might have been willing to support the Republican candidate, while hardcore Bernie Sanders supporters might have jumped to support Jill Stein in 2016.

This state of affairs has historically been an issue for the left, because it gave them almost no leverage within the party. If you could not win the primary, then the most you could do was support a left-wing third party. At best, that would do nothing; at worst, it would lose the election for the Democrat and anger the Democratic base. Now that the left is winning important primaries, however, the dynamics have begun to shift.

No one group better shows the problems that centrists now face within the Democratic Party than Black voters. In most major primary elections over the past decade, centrist candidates have counted Black voters among their base in primary elections, as Black voters are some of the strongest partisan voters in the country. An inability to break into these strongly Democratic-supporting communities is the primary reason why Bernie Sanders fell short in both of his presidential bids, and downballot progressives nearly always have similar troubles.

Because of their historic association with the centrist faction of the Democratic Party, centrists have increasingly begun to claim some degree of ownership over Black voters. Even white candidates like Haley Stevens couch their criticism of the left in terms of racial conflict — white leftists are trying to come in and silence the voices of Black voters. During the primary, this tactic has some effectiveness, or at least it does not hurt their cause.

The same can not be said once a left-wing candidate actually wins the primary. Once again, Zohran Mamdani’s election shows a clear pattern. During the primary, [Mamdani was handily defeated](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/24/us/elections/nyc-mayor-primary-results-precinct-map.html?eafs%5Fenabled=false&ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) in the city’s largest majority-Black neighborhoods in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx, even though he narrowly won overall. During the general election, however, against the same opponent, [he easily won these same neighborhoods](https://www.electionatlas.nyc/maps.html?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), propelling him to a comfortable majority in the three-way race. The same can now be seen with Abdul El-Sayed: he lost Black voters in the primary, but [won them nearly unanimously in the general election](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/11/03/us/elections/results-michigan-us-senate.html?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), outperforming Kamala Harris’s margins in 2024.

Black voters are the clearest example of this phenomenon, but it can be seen in other Democratic constituencies, such as suburban liberals. This presents a major problem for bolters like Andrew Cuomo and Haley Stevens. Centrists do have some ideological voters that are able to make the jump with them to the Republican or Independent side — some older voters, Jewish Zionists, and affluent moderates. However, these are usually not enough to swing a highly competitive general election, especially in a year like 2026 where Republicans are incredibly unpopular. Instead, they risk angering the vast majority of Democratic voters in the process of jumping ship — sinking their individual political careers, and eventually their broader project. Negative polarization is an incredibly powerful force.

## **Centrists vs Moderates**

Negative polarization combined with the ideological and monetary constraints mentioned in the previous section make the current state of affairs quite dire for the modern centrist movement within the Democratic Party. The main advantage they have now is that of incumbency. In Congress, the leaders of both Democratic caucuses are committed centrists, and those positions are generally more difficult to directly challenge, but they will increasingly need to manage caucuses filled with anti-centrist members. Many of the most popular names for the 2028 nomination are centrists who were able to build power before these recent dynamics took hold — though at least as many are committed progressives, or opportunists who are likely to see where the wind is blowing. 

Before speaking too grandly about the potential fall of centrism, it is important to set a distinction between centrists and moderates. In modern times, I would define a centrist as someone specifically committed to the centrist movement — think someone like Hakeem Jeffries or an editor at The Atlantic. Their interest is as much in battling the left as it is the right, and they root their politics in defending specific interests from activists within their own party.

Moderates within the Democratic Party are somewhat different. A moderate Democrat in 2026 looks more like Adam Hamilton, Gina Hinojosa, or even Scott Colom. Many of these politicians are rooted in a more explicitly progressive politics, though moderating on key issues that match their state. While someone like James Talarico was definitely not a candidate of the DSA or even the left flank of the Democratic Party, [his launch speech in 2025](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/IpO0SeFLlFc?feature=share&ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) was taken almost directly from the [race-class narrative](https://www.wemakethefuture.us/history-of-the-race-class-narrative?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io), a messaging project pushed by the activist left within the party for nearly a decade. His moderation instead came from his embrace of Texas’s important gas and oil sector. Many moderates now follow that pattern. Rep. Pat Ryan, who represents a swingy upstate New York district and yet is relatively friendly with AOC, [posted a thread](https://x.com/PatRyanUC/status/2118690625310875688?ref=patterns-on-patterns.ghost.io) about how he frames his politics in an explicitly anti-corporate “top vs bottom” way.

Obsessive coverage of the battle between the socialists and the centrists — driven by the heavily online nature of both groups — has somewhat obscured the development of this economically populist moderate bloc that is not particularly hostile to the party’s left. This is certainly aided by Donald Trump’s unifying presence, but it is not entirely a fluke. The same ideological polarization that is hurting the centrist movement allows relatively liberal people to run moderate campaigns that can take advantage of unpopular Republicans without completely selling out the base. Even activist organizations typically associated with older white liberals, such as Indivisible, have been moving in this direction.

Centrists are now battling against time. Every election cycle, millennials and Generation Z become a large portion of the electorate, more and more voters get their news from social media, and wealth inequality becomes even more dire. Ironically, the best bet at reversing some of the polarization harming centrists comes through progressive governance that many moderates are actually on board with, even if centrists are not: taxation of the rich with redistribution to the middle and working class, heavy regulation of social media and campaign spending, and investment in education. The alternative to these things is not centrism; it’s fascism. If the center cannot hold itself together, they will perhaps have to hand over the reins for a bit.